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Abstract 
Focusing on the case of Lebanon in which refugee concentration is the highest in the 
world relative to the population size, this paper aims to explore which factors shape 
initial policy preferences and changes over time in the first refugee destination 
countries. The paper specifically questions the policy responses of Lebanon to the 
Syrian refugee movement from 2012 to 2016, the motivations behind policies and the 
consequences of change. The paper argues that despite historically being a refugee 
receiving country, Lebanon has had neither structured border management, nor 
effective reception, protection and integration policies. Instead, it has largely adopted 
ad hoc policies for each refugee group. Through its response to the Syrian refugee 
movement in the initial years, Lebanon's inaction showed characteristics of policy 
paralysis, a situation in which the government was unable to create or implement policy 
programs. The government was only able to block undesirable policy options, such as 
the establishment of camps, and to implement few ad-hoc policies that overall 
exemplify inaction. However, since the end of 2014, inaction has been replaced by 
restrictive measures on border management and reception to dissuade Syrian refugees, 
while the creation of protection and integration policies has been avoided. Policy 
changes in border control and reception reflect the Lebanese state’s recognition of a 
demographic challenge, its desire to appease growing negative public sentiment, to 
renegotiate its sovereignty vis-à-vis growing security challenges and to increase the 
involvement of international organizations (IOs) in refugee governance. On the other 
hand, Lebanon refrains from developing protection and integration measures due to a 
lack of capacity, ideational concerns pertaining to a delicate sectarian balance, as well 
as its historical experience with the protracted Palestinian refugee issue. The paper is 
based on qualitative research including case study evaluation, process tracing and 
policy ethnography. Data is drawn from the desk research of secondary literature, 
published reports and news as well as on fieldwork.  
Keywords  
refugee governance, refugee policies, refugee hosting countries, Lebanon, Syrian mass 
flow, Syrian refugee movement, politics of refugees in Middle East 
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From Inaction to Restrictions: Changes in 
Lebanon’s Policy Responses to Syrian Mass 
Refugee Movement* 
 
by Zeynep Şahin Mencutek 
 
1 Introduction 
How do first refugee destination countries respond to mass forced migration? 
Which factors have led these refugee hosting countries of the Global South to cope 
with the vast majority of the world’s refugee population, redefining their initial 
inaction in multiple new directions ranging from restrictive to accommodating or 
ambiguous policies? Despite receiving less attention in the refugee studies 
literature—in comparison to research on refugee policies of the Global North—
case studies reveal that the national policies of these countries and changes over 
time can be understood within the context of their historic, political, socio-
economic and governance conditions, the specific characteristics of refugee flows, 
as well as their relations with refugee sending countries and international actors. 
Extensive case studies, and ideally comparative studies, may offer some insights 
about the policy preferences and impetus for change. 
As of November 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees 
(UNHCR) reports 1,017,433 registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon1 along with 
449,957 Palestinian refugees who were registered with United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency (UNRWA).2 The country with a population of almost 6 million3 has 
                                                          
 * I would like to thank the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre of Global Cooperation Research for 
supporting this research paper. I further want to express my gratitude to Faten Ghosn, Frank 
Gadinger, Markus Böckenförde, and Martin Wolf for their advice and suggestions on the 
paper; Bezen Balamir for her comments on an early version of the paper; Estella Carpi, Sinem 
Uygun, Valentina Facchinetti, and Maria A. D’Angelo for their support in data collection. Many 
thanks also to Nina Fink for the comprehensive editorial support. 
 1 Since 2015, UNHCR Lebanon has temporarily suspended new registration as per Government 
of Lebanon’s instructions. Accordingly, individuals awaiting to be registered are no longer 
included. See UNHCR and UNDP 2016; European Commission/European Humanitarian Aid and 
Civil Protection 2016. 
 2 UNRWA is mandated to provide assistance to Palestinian refugees in its five areas of 
operation (Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank). See UNRWA 2016. 
 3 For Lebanon, the World Bank provides a population estimate of 5,850,743 for 2015. World 
Bank data is maintained by the Lebanese Government. World Bank total population estimates 
are based on the de facto definition of a population, which counts all residents regardless of 
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turned into the country with the highest concentration of refugees worldwide.  
Syrian refugees live in over 1,700 communities, in various locations across the 
country. 70.5 percent of them continue to live below the poverty line, while many 
rely on humanitarian aid to survive.4 In 2015, countries outside of the region 
offered only 4,500 resettlement and humanitarian admission places for refugees in 
Lebanon—this is less than 0.04 percent of Syrian refugees.5 Lebanon shoulders a 
heavier burden in comparison to other host countries with respect to its refugee 
concentration, in part due to its shaky economic performance, inadequate 
infrastructure and weak governance capabilities. The words of Lebanon Prime 
Minister Tammam Salam, in the first ever United Nations (UN) Migrants and 
Refugee Summit in September 2016, gives insights into the critical perceptions 
within Lebanon that have evolved in response to the great refugee-burden: 
More Syrians are born in Lebanon than are being resettled in other 
countries. It is unthinkable that Lebanon could alone cope with an 
existential challenge of such proportion…when is the world going to 
do something for Lebanon? ... This huge and sudden influx of 
refugees is posing dangerous risks to our stability, security, economy 
and public services … Lebanon risks collapsing if the international 
community does not exert major efforts in this regard … United 
Nations (UN) should devise a detailed roadmap for the safe and 
honourable return of the Syrian refugees who are present in Lebanon 
to their country.6 
It is important to trace how Lebanon came to the point of urging the 
international society towards a repatriation of Syrian refugees. Drawing data from 
desk research and fieldwork, the paper argues that despite historically being a 
refugee receiving country, Lebanon had neither structured border management, 
nor adequate reception, protection or integration policies until the end of 2014. In 
responding to the Syrian refugee crisis, its overall inaction was marked by pursuing 
ad-hoc policies and blocking undesirable options such the erection of camps. 
However, Lebanon has recently chosen to formulate a strict policy of border 
management and reception to dissuade Syrian refugees, while avoiding the 
creation of protection and integration policies. Policy changes in border control 
and reception stem from the Lebanese state’s recognition of a demographic 
challenge associated with its refugee concentration, its desire to appease negative 
public sentiment, its efforts to renegotiate its sovereignty vis-à-vis increasing 
public security concerns and the involvement of international organizations in 
refugee governance. On the other hand, it has refrained from framing any 
protection and integration policy because of a lack of capacity, ideational concerns 
                                                                                                                                                               
their legal status or citizenship. The values shown are midyear estimates. See World Bank 
2017. 
 4 UNHCR/Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon 2016. 
 5 UNHCR aimed to resettle 9,000 Syrian refugees from Lebanon in 2015. See UNHCR and UNDP 
2015. 
 6 Naharnat 2016. 
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about a delicate sectarian balance and its historical experience with the protracted 
Palestinian refugee issue.   
These arguments will be elaborated throughout the paper in the following order. 
The paper will first briefly review the political structure of Lebanon, its historical 
relations with Syria, and the policy paralysis situation so as to provide an overview 
of the policy-making context. Second, it will move to summarize migration patterns 
to and from Lebanon with a specific focus on the existent national refugee regime 
before the mass flow started in March 2011. The third section will address the 
initial response, here referred to as the inaction policies period between 2012 and 
fall 2014, and detail its reasons. Fourth, a section will be devoted to outlining policy 
changes and their implementation since early 2015, here considered as a policy of 
acceptance and regulation. This section will fifth be followed by a discussion of the 
motivations that lie behind policy changes. In conclusion, the paper will propose 
some hypotheses about policy responses to mass flows in the main hosting 
countries of the Global South and the effects that these have had on the global 
refugee regime. 
2 Political Structure of Lebanon and Relations with Syria 
During the first years of the 1920s, under the League of Nations’ mandate 
system, France was assigned the mandate of Syria and Lebanon. Since 
independence in 1943, Lebanon has struggled with a society deeply divided along 
sectarian and religious lines. The most recent demographic study conducted in 
2011 by Statistics Lebanon, a Beirut-based research firm, indicated that 27 percent 
of the population are Sunni Muslim, 27 percent Shia Muslim, 21 percent Maronite 
Christian, 8 percent Greek Orthodox, 5 percent Druze, and 4 percent Greek 
Catholic, with the remaining 7 percent belonging to smaller Christian 
denominations and other religious groups.7 
The ethno-religious fabric is directly reflected in the political sphere, with a so-
called a corporate consociational system.8 The Lebanese constitution dates back to 
1926. It requires that Christians and Muslims be represented equally in the 
parliament, in the cabinet, and in high-level civil service positions and also calls for a 
proportional representation among geographic regions.9 The 1943 National Pact 
shapes the post-independence confessional politics and stipulates that the 
president must be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the 
speaker of the parliament a Shia Muslim.10 The constitutional and then pact-based 
provisions for the distribution of political power and positions are designed to 
establish equality between Christians and Muslims, to improve internal unity within 
Lebanon and to prevent a single confessional group from gaining a dominant 
                                                          
 7 For political reasons, the Lebanese Central Administration of Statistics—under the authority 
of Presidency of Council of Ministers—does not collect survey data about the sectarian 
denomotions. See US Department of State 2011. 
 8 Kerr 2012. 
 9 See Republic of Lebanon 1995.  
 10 US Department of State 2011. 
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position. Nevertheless, competition for political power and pertinent deadlocks in 
the system are an inevitable part of political life. This pact also ‘embodied 
Lebanese unity vis-à-vis the outside world, mainly Syria (the major actor in 
Lebanon's regional order), and France (the major colonial power in Syria and 
Lebanon)’.11 
Historically, Lebanese politics can be characterized as having been in a constant 
state of emergency with respect to two occupying neighbouring forces—Israel and 
Syria—and as facing a constant risk of becoming a battle ground for wider regional 
conflicts. Invasions, political violence and civil strife have been recurrent since the 
start of the civil war in 1975. Internal troubles were further compounded by the 
Israeli invasion of the country in 1978 and 1982, the war against Israeli occupation 
of Southern Lebanon, Operation Grapes of Wrath (1996), July War (2006), and the 
Nahr Al Bared crisis (2007). Fifteen years of civil war ended in 1989 with the 
internationally brokered Taif Accords that revised some of the power-sharing 
provisions laid out in the 1943 National Pact.12 Syria became the ‘official guarantor 
of the peace’, a status that resulted in the Syrian regime assuming de facto political 
and military control of Lebanon.13 While some Lebanese politicians maintained 
close relationship with Syrian regime and developed cooperation among both 
countries, others have preferred more distant relationship and took antagonistic 
stance towards the Syrian regime.14 The assassination of former Lebanese Prime 
Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005 led to a Lebanese uprising against the Syrian 
presence in Lebanon. At the end, Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon. But, the 
uprising further polarized Lebanese political elites, gradually leading to a policy 
paralysis situation. 
3 Situation of 'Policy Paralysis' in Lebanon 
Since 2005, Lebanon’s main political forces have gathered along two main 
political fronts and have organized large demonstrations both in favour and against 
Syrian withdrawal. These have been named after dates in that year: the March 14 
Alliance and the March 8 Alliance, respectively.15 The March 14 camp views Syria as 
the perpetrator of Hariri’s assassination, has an anti-Syrian stance, and is backed by 
countries like the US and France. The March 8 camp supports Syria’s extensive role 
in Lebanon and is backed by Iran.16 Acute political divisions brought Lebanon's 
                                                          
 11  El-Khazen 1991. 
 12 The powers of the president (a Maronite) were reduced, while the council of ministers was 
given more prominence as a multi-sectarian decision-making body. Ratio in the legislature 
between Christians and Muslims replaced the pre-war six-to-five ratio that favoured 
Christians. See Fakhoury 2015. 
 13 Berti and Lee 2014: 95. 
 14 Thibos 2014: 2. 
 15 Daher 2016. 
 16 The country’s major parliamentary blocs and parties reflect a socially and confessionally 
mixed population. The March 14 coalition has been led by the (mainly Sunni) Future 
Movement, supported by the (mainly Christian) Lebanese Forces Party, the (mainly Maronite) 
Phalanges Party and other small parties. The March 8 camp is led by the (Shiite) Islamist 
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institutions to a gradual state of stalemate and finally created policy paralysis after 
2011.17 
From the public governance perspective, policy paralysis refers to a situation in 
which a government is ‘unable to create or implement policy programs’.18 More 
specifically, it describes a situation where important laws, reforms, and policies are 
not enacted because of a lack of commitment on part of the government and an 
inability of the government to reach a consensus over the correct form and the 
timing.  Also policy paralysis refers to contexts in which, despite the presence of 
policy, it is not acted upon or implemented to achieve the desired ends.  According 
to Wilensky, ‘the indicators of policy paralysis include (a) both elites and masses 
favouring a policy or program, (b) other countries that have acted successfully, and 
(c) no action for the country concerned’.19 As Tambulasi writes: ‘policy paralysis is 
not an inherent phenomenon but a “contingent condition” triggered by various 
factors, key to which are institutions’.20 
Lebanon has experienced chronic policy paralysis due to a combination of factors, 
including the delicacy of its political system, internal deadlocks and external 
threats. Subsequent governments have had limited motivation and ability to 
initiate coherent and long term policies that would appease all the domestic 
groups. Rather, governments have introduced ad hoc policies that were unable to 
change the status quo and they have also failed to fully implement existing 
policies.21 This has generated political mistrust and scepticism about the 
government’s ability to bring about positive changes—a perception of the central 
state further compounded by the widespread sense that it also suffers from deeply 
rooted corruption and semi-dysfunctional institutions. In order to fill the existing 
gap, many non-state actors, ranging from political parties to national and 
international NGOs, civil society organizations and faith groups perform the state—
i.e. provide social welfare, protection and safety to various communities and carry 
out development activities at local levels.22 
During the early years of the Arab Spring revolt, Lebanon looked inward and 
remained calm, but spill-over of uprisings in Syria fed divisions within the country 
and would, in turn, worsen the paralysis.23  As noted below, during the Syrian civil 
war, Lebanon was 
ever-more polarized between pro- and anti-Syrian supporters due to 
the pre-existing political and increasingly sectarian cleavage … the 
                                                                                                                                                               
Hezbollah, and is supported by the (mainly Christian) Free Patriotic Movement, the (mainly 
Shiite) Amal Movement, the (mainly Maronite) Marada Party and other small parties.  See 
Knudsen and Kerr 2012. 
 17 Prof. Faten Ghosn brought this point to my attention. I am borrowing this term from her. A 
number of studies also refer to policy paralysis in discussing Lebanon's politics. See Felsch and 
Wählisch 2016: 34; Bana 2015. 
 18 Amy 1983: 345; Tambulasi 2011: 335. 
 19 Wilensky 2002: 693. 
 20 Tambulasi 2011: 336; Hermes 2005: 5–7.  
 21 Carpi 2014: 404. 
 22 Ibid.: 406–407; Mouzahem 2016.   
 23 Fakhoury 2015; Salem 2012. 
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steady rise in internal violence, boosting domestic Salafi-jihadist 
groups and overall leading to renewed political and societal 
instability.24 
The March 14 leaders politically and materially supported Syrian rebels, and 
called for an intervention to overthrow the regime; while March 8 leaders called for 
a political resolution that would preserve stability and the status quo that favoured 
them in Syria. The March 14 alliance, particularly Hezbollah, fought with Assad 
forces against the rebels.25 On the other hand, the government led by Najib Mikati 
(June 2011-March 2013) tried to play a delicate balancing game to protect from 
effects of the Syrian civil war. Calling it a disassociation policy, the government 
refrained from participating in any international sanctions or condemnations 
against the Syrian regime, referring to all problems as ‘internal matters’.26 Mikati 
publicly expressed the country’s dilemma when he stated: ‘taking a position 
[against Syria] would hurt our geopolitical interests, while being against Arabs 
would force us to lose in several ways’.27 As expected, the disassociation policy 
failed and Mikati resigned in early 2013 due to intensifying pressures between the 
March 8 and March 14 alliances. 
The recurring policy paralysis situation reached its peak when the government 
could not be formed within the course of a year. Finally, independent candidate 
Tammam Salam was elected as Prime Minister and a new government formed. 
Thereafter, the presidential post remained vacant for two and half years (May 
2014–October 2016), due to the failed election attempts in 45 previous sessions of 
the parliament. The cabinet—divided along pro- and anti-Syria lines–was unable to 
make progress, and the parliament lacked sufficient consensus to convene on key 
legislations. Meanwhile, the unity of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), which used 
to be the most trusted institution in Lebanon, came under increasing strain 
because of accusations that it allegedly favoured the Hezbollah and the Shiite 
community over the Sunnis and that it contributed to the spread of violence across 
the country.28 In the words of Prime Minister Tammam Salam in August 2015 in a 
television speech: ‘I warn we are moving towards collapse if matters continue’.29 
Finally, Michel Aoun was elected as Lebanon’s 13rd president on 31 October 2016 
with the support of Hezbollah.30 Under President Michel Aoun, Saad Hariri 
managed to form the first national consensus government in December 2016, 
despite differences that erupted between the major blocs over the number of 
ministers and their responsibilities. 
In this era of political vacuum, although elites and masses favoured policies to 
strengthen stability and security, limited actions were taken towards fixing the 
country’s accumulating problems. Most policy issues were neglected or shelved 
                                                          
 24 Berti and Lee 2014: 100. 
 25 Lebanon Support 2015: 14; Makdisi 2015: 202. 
 26 Constantine 2012. 
 27 The Daily Star 2012a. 
 28 Yacoubian 2014: 3. 
 29 Schmitt 2016.   
 30 Hashem 2016. 
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despite deteriorating socio-economic and environmental conditions.31 The 
government was unable to address issues like poverty and development and was 
only able to act very slowly in improving basic infrastructure services such as water, 
electricity, and garbage services.32  War in neighbouring Syria and the steady influx 
of more than one million Syrian refugees did not help to overcome the paralysis.33 
The policy paralysis was also reflected in the stance towards Syrian refugees. 
Lebanese government acted carefully, slowly and inadequately in policy making 
during the initial years—intending to maintain a status quo of ad hoc policies and 
half-heartedly implementing existing legislation, which will be discussed in more 
detail below. Before moving onto this discussion, it is important to review the 
country’s national migration and refugee legislation, previous migration ties with 
Syria, and the Palestinian refugee experience, which in sum came to define inaction 
towards the Syrian mass refugee movement.  
4 History of Migration in Lebanon and the National Refugee 
Regime 
Lebanon can be characterized as a source, destination and transit country. As a 
source country, it is estimated that 990,000 people left the country during the civil 
war, accounting for 40 percent of the total population.34 The 2006 July war led to a 
displacement of around one million Lebanese to the southern regions and to the 
suburbs of Beirut. During this massive displacement, 180,000 found refuge in Syria 
where the government pursued an open door policy and provided shelter and relief 
to Lebanese.35 Soon after the ceasefire, many displaced Lebanese returned home. 
Lebanon used to be destination country for labour migrants. Since 1943, many 
Syrian workers have migrated to serve in agriculture, construction and service 
sectors. Several bilateral agreements were signed between Syria and Lebanon to 
facilitate the access to work, including, for instance, the Economic and Social 
Cooperation and Coordination Agreement in 1993 that enforces ‘freedom of 
persons’ movement between both countries; as well as freedom to stay, work, 
employ and practice economic activity in conformity with the laws and regulations 
in force in each country’.36 Estimates of the number of Syrian migrants in Lebanon 
vary between one hundred thousands to one million, since no official records are 
kept on the migrant population.37 The Senior Protection Officer for UNHCR in 
Beirut reported that: ‘… even before the conflict some of the rumours suggested 
that as many as 700,000 were in this country. They were Syrians coming in and out 
all the time as well …’38 Another informant seemed sure that there were one 
                                                          
 31 Makdisi 2015: 34. 
 32 Lebanon Support 2015: 15. 
 33 International Monetary Fund 2015.  
 34 Tabar 2009: 9. 
 35 Murphy 2006.  
 36 Syrian Lebanese Higher Council 1993. 
 37 Murphy 2006. 
 38 Interview with the UNHCR Senior Protection Officer in Beirut Office, Beirut, 13 April 2016. 
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million Syrian workers who went back and forth.39 Also, workers from Egypt, Sri 
Lanka, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, Ethiopia, and elsewhere have been coming 
to Lebanon thanks to its laissez-faire labour-market policy and the contract-labour 
work system.40 
Lebanon has historically also been a refugee receiving country. Many people 
fleeing religious mistreatment and discrimination in neighbouring states 
immigrated here. In the 2000s, it was the wars in Iraq, Somalia and Sudan that 
resulted in significant refugee flows to Lebanon. The most notable refugee 
population in the country are Palestinians.41 An estimated 260,000 to 280,000 of 
the 450,000 registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon continue to depend on 
UNRWA’s work in camps while the rest live in areas outside of the camps. Relations 
between Lebanese and Palestinians have been tense due to security reasons and 
primarily the camps have been seen as a security weakness that could blast at any 
time. This fear has historical roots. 
Since the mid-1960s, the camps in Lebanon became the centre of Palestinian 
nationalism and resistance against the Israeli state. The 1969 Cairo Agreement 
between the Lebanese government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) delegation, passed control over the 16 Palestinian refugee camps from the 
Lebanese Armed Forces to the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command.42 The Cairo 
Agreement laid down a virtual autonomy (state-within-a-state) in southern 
Lebanon, whereby camps became enclaves out of reach of Lebanese law. The PLO 
was allowed to operate in refugee camps and to train, arm and recruit fighters, 
using Lebanese territory as its base for military attacks against Israel. Military 
activities continued in the camps, parallel with the on-going Israel-Palestinian 
conflict. Israel’s invasion of Lebanon (1982–2000) revealed the existence of salafist 
jihadist networks inside some Palestinian camps. In order to extend Lebanese state 
authority and law to camps, Lebanese parliament declared null and void the Cairo 
agreement in 1987.43 Despite the state’s attempts at substantial disarmament in 
the camps in 1991, significant weapon caches remained intact and the armed 
groups continued their activities. Some groups, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, 
locate themselves primarily within Palestinian nationalist space, while salafist 
jihadist groups have moved into the realm of global Islamic insurgency—
particularly established Al-Qaeda networks.44 Some camps like Ain al-Hilwah, the 
largest one in Southern Lebanon, reportedly turned into a teeming recruiting 
ground for Al Qaeda currents in Lebanon.45 It is not a coincidence that this camp is 
also the most impoverished and radical refugee camp in the country, which hosts 
more than a dozen militant factions all competing for influence inside the camp. 
Nevertheless, it is quite important to note that ‘salafist jihadism in Lebanon is not 
exclusively a Palestinian phenomenon and that its universe is not limited to the 
                                                          
 39 Interview with a Lebanese Co-director of an international NGO, Beirut, 14 April 2016. 
 40 Murphy 2006. 
 41 Yassine 2010.  
 42 See UNRWA (n.d.). 
 43 Hanafi 2008: 86. 
 44 Norton 1998: 154; Rougier 2007: 4.   
 45 Saab and Ranstorp 2007: 837. 
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Palestinian refugee camps’.46 It has also attracted a large number of Lebanese 
followers from the early 1998 onwards, intensifying significantly after the 2003 
Iraqi war.47 
Given this background, in parallel with the politically volatile post–civil war 
conditions, Lebanese security forces tried to imply strict surveillance and control 
over camps and targeted several salafi jihadist groups in and outside of the camps. 
The Lebanese army first confronted salafist jihadists groups in December 1999 in a 
six-day insurgency in Tripoli in northern Lebanon, claiming the lives of 11 soldiers, 5 
civilians and 15 militants.48 Since then, salafist jihadist groups have reportedly been 
involved in a series of assassinations, counter assassinations, and suicide bombings 
targeting politicians, spiritual figures, military officials, judges, civilians from 
various Lebanese sects/communities (also among Palestinians) and have attacked 
state institutions, several embassies and shops in Beirut.49 
The Lebanese state intentionally delayed the introduction of comprehensive 
policies for Palestinian refugees, which worsened problems pertaining to 
residency, employment, and access to government services. Their legal status 
remains similar that of foreigners, creating obstacles to the equal fulfilment of 
social, civil and economic rights. Palestinians are not allowed to work in more than 
20 professions and they are also unable to claim the same rights as foreigners who 
work and live in Lebanon.50 Discriminatory restrictions concerning access to the 
labour market make self-sufficiency and empowerment of Palestinians difficult.51 
The nationality laws remain strict, since children born to Lebanese mothers and 
foreign fathers are not granted citizenship. If their father is a Palestinian, they end 
up being stateless.52 Lebanon rejects discussing naturalization to Palestinians, 
claiming that latter should maintain the right of return and that any future 
naturalisation would risk disturbing Lebanon’s delicate confessional balance.53 As 
Sari Hanafi correctly states: ‘In a deeply divided political and sectarian context, the 
only common ground between various Lebanese political parties is that permanent 
settlement of Palestinians is a taboo’.54 Nevertheless, a limited number of 
Palestinian refugees have been naturalised with governmental decrees. There were 
a number of Palestinians among the 300 individuals and families (about 644 people 
in total) who were granted Lebanese citizenship with the decree of former 
President Michel Suleiman’s in June 2014, which sparked public outcry. It served as 
a reminder that ‘there is a politicization of naturalization that can be done 
depending on who is in authority in the country’.55   
                                                          
 46 Ibid.: 825–26. 
 47 Ibid. 
 48 Ibid.: 833. 
 49 Ibid. 
 50 See UNRWA 2016.  
 51 Jones and Ksaifi 2016.  
 52 Nationality provisions in Lebanon are governed by Decree No.15 issued on 19/1/1925 and its 
amendments. 
 53 Migration Policy Centre 2013: 6; Christophersen et al. 2013: 51. 
 54 Hanafi 2014: 591. 
 55 Interview with the UNHCR Senior Protection Officer in Beirut Office, Beirut, 13 April 2016. 
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Despite its long-term hosting commitment to both Palestinian and non-
Palestinian refugees, Lebanon has avoided adopting the international refugee 
instruments, such as the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. Similar to 
other Middle Eastern states, it has been reluctant to ratify the Convention due to 
concerns that ratification might mean approval of ‘UNHCR’s proposal about local 
integration or resettlement for Palestinians at the expense of Palestinians’ right of 
return’.56 Nevertheless, Lebanon is bound by the key facet of refugee law, namely 
the non-refoulement principle. This forbids returning people to places where their 
life and freedom could be threatened, and where they could be at risk of being 
persecuted, tortured, or exposed to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.57 
The relationship between Lebanon and the agencies of the international national 
refugee regime was established in light of the protracted Palestinian displacement. 
While UNRWA has a specific mandate to provide services to Palestinian refugees 
across the region since 1943, UNHCR established an office in Beirut in the 1980s to 
keep a close watch on non-Palestinian refugees and asylum seekers.58 Triggered by 
the Iraqi refugee flow, Lebanon signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
with UNHCR in September 2003. This MoU seems to be the only structured means 
of collaboration for UNHCR, because Lebanon did not sign the 1951 Convention 
and its 1967 Protocol. Despite the MoU, it has been issuing arrests, detentions and 
deportations of asylum seekers who are identified as illegal entrants according to 
Lebanese law.59 The MoU granted the UNHCR authority to conduct registration, 
documentation and refugee status determination (RSD) in addition to the provision 
of financial, medical, and educational assistance.60 The MoU formally ensures the 
right of asylum seekers to remain in Lebanon until the UNHCR is able to find 
durable solutions such as repatriation or resettlement of refugees to a third 
country. The content of the MoU specifies that ‘asylum seeker’ means a ‘person 
seeking asylum in a country other than Lebanon’, acknowledging Lebanon’s 
assertion for not being an asylum country.61 Informed by the UNHCR about asylum 
seeking applications, the Lebanese General Security Office issues temporary 
residence permits to asylum seekers, normally for three months (and up to a 
maximum of 6-9 months). During this period, the UNHCR is expected to review an 
asylum claim and initiate a resettlement process. However, this MoU was designed 
to deal with individual asylum seeking cases but not with mass flows. In the words 
of a Senior Protection Officer from UNHCR Beirut Bureau: 
The MoU reflects at least an outlook from the government. It views 
that refugees would be something small, something that can be 
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 57 The Syria Needs Analysis Project 2013. 
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 59 UNHCR 2004. 
 60 Ibid. 
 61 Janmyr 2016: 10. 
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contained and something that is entirely relying on the international 
community to solve the problems.62 
The UNHCR has discussed updating the current MOU with Lebanese authorities, 
but so far nothing has been finalized and the proposed MoU is pending for 
approval at the Council of Ministers.63 In sum, it can be concluded that Lebanon had 
almost no national refugee legislation in place, when the mass flow started from 
Syria in March 2011. 
5 Initial Responses to Mass Syrian Refugee Flow: Inaction 
from 2012 to late 2014 
Lebanon allowed entry of those fleeing from conflict in Syria via five official 
border crossings and unofficial crossings along porous borders where control 
retained minimal.64 Following the pre-crisis regulations, Lebanese authorities had 
allowed Syrians with an identity card or passport to enter the country without 
issuing a visa requirement.65 Also many Syrian workers in Lebanon brought their 
families in the context of massive migration flows. Entry coupon and stamp at the 
border was adequate to be granted a free-of-charge residency permit for a period 
of six months with the right to renew the residency for an additional six months 
with nearly no fee.66 However, Palestinian refugees coming from Syria (PRS) have 
been subjected to a different treatment. They have been entitled to a visa valid for 
15 days, which could be renewed for up to three months with the payment of a fee. 
In February 2013, the government circular provided that PRS could obtain a 3-
month visa free-of-charge.67 
In general, border entry procedures were eased for Syrians, particularly between 
February and August 2013. Thereafter, the Lebanese authorities started to impose 
restrictions on the entry of PRS by asking for a valid pre-approved visa that 
required an application made by a guarantor.68 In May 2014, the government put in 
place new entry requirements effectively closing the border to all PRS, which also 
applied to all Syrians in October 2014.69 
It was clear from the beginning that the flight of civilians from Syria is a mass 
refugee flow of persons seeking urgent and temporary protection. According to 
                                                          
 62 Interview with an UNHCR Senior Protection Officer in Beirut Office, Beirut, 13 April 2016.  
 63 Janmyr 2016: 10. 
 64 Official border crossings include Aarida (between Homs and northern Lebanon), El 
Aabboudiye (between Tartous and northern Lebanon), Qaa Baalbek (at the northern end of 
the Bekaa valley), Al-Masnaa (between rural Damascus and Bekaa), and Wadi Kahled (between 
northern Lebanonand Homs). In addition, there are several unofficial crossing points. See BBC 
News 2015.  
 65 The Syria Needs Analysis Project 2013; Saghleh and Frangieh 2014. 
 66 Bobseine 2016.  
 67 Ibid. 
 68 Amnesty International 2014a.  
 69 Ibid. 
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the UNHCR, all Syrians entering Lebanon deserve prima facie recognition of 
refugee status, meaning ‘when dire situations, such as internal conflicts, result in 
large influxes of people fleeing their country, the Convention regards each 
member of that population as a prima facie refugee’.70 Lebanon did not adopt this 
international prima facie refugee status.71 It intentionally avoided using the word 
of laji (refugee) and instead preferred to call individuals who had fled from Syria to 
Lebanon and those who could not return after March 2011 nazih (displaced).72 The 
term of displaced was applied to all refugees, including PRS, registered and 
unregistered Syrian nationals as well as persons registered as refugees by 
UNHCR.73 However, the term of displaced persons is quite vague, being used to 
refer not only to those displaced, but also to those who have crossed international 
borders and thereby have become refugees. 
In the first three years, the Lebanese state did not regularly register displaced 
Syrians. While municipalities and UNHCR offices registered refugees, the General 
Security Office—affiliated with the Ministry of Interior—granted residency permits. 
But the registration of UNHCR was not mandatory, only voluntary, in order to be 
able to get aid and protection. There have been many refugees who have not been 
registered at all due to well-grounded fears. Institutionally, the Ministry of Social 
Affairs has a leading position on refugee issues and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
deals with borders, donors and the international legal framework for refugees. 
As almost all interviewees noted, Lebanon has been experiencing paralysis when 
it comes to formulating policies, providing governance and ensuring coordination. 
To tackle the refugee challenge, the government prepared a response plan on 3 
December 2012, but the plan was never adopted because the Prime Minister Najib 
Mikati resigned and the new cabinet failed to adopt the plan.74 Nevertheless, the 
government made a concerted effort to block particularly undesirable options such 
as the erection of refugee camps.75 In official policies, there is no trace of the 
intention to build camps, unlike the case in other hosting countries such as Jordan 
and Turkey.76 The government also did not propose sustainable alternatives for 
shelters and opposed the building of non-permanent Refugee Housing Units. Due 
to the lack of camps, in the course of a few years, more than one million refugees 
have become scattered around 1150 municipalities, of which many of them are 
administratively and fiscally too weak to meet the basic needs of their 
communities.77 The same municipalities have to play a crucial role in refugee 
governance because they often serve as the first point of reference for legal and 
social issues after displaced Syrians arrive in Lebanon.78 Municipalities carry out 
Syrian refugee needs in terms of ‘registering new arrivals, maintaining security, 
ensuring adequate and sufficient water, electricity and sanitation services, 
                                                          
 70 See UNHCR 2016. 
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facilitating shelter by providing housing assistance, as well as preventing and 
mediating community tensions’.79 All of these challenging tasks have put more 
pressure on already strained municipal systems. 
UN agencies, particularly UNHCR along with INGOs and local NGOs, carried out 
financial assistance, food delivery, counselling and referral services. The Ministry of 
Education and Higher Education committed to ensure free access to education. All 
Syrian students are entitled to enrol in public schools for reduced fees.80 As of 
September 2016, 330 Lebanese schools—mainly funded by UN agencies, INGOs and 
NGOs—have been offering a second block of classes during the day, in order to 
allow 469,000 Syrian children to continue their education.81 In terms of healthcare, 
once registered, Syrians have been able to access primary healthcare through 
existing Lebanese healthcare structures. Unregistered Syrians with serious health 
concerns can enter a fast track registration procedure.82 Meanwhile, the UN 
agencies and INGOs also support the Lebanese public institutions in their service 
provisions. They have collaborated with municipal actors to strengthen their 
capacity in electricity, irrigation canals, water networks and solid waste 
management as well as pertaining to health services.83 
6 Motivations behind Inaction and Ad hoc Policies 
As discussed above, the Lebanese inaction or ‘policy of no policy’ in the words of 
Mat Nashed84 reflects a state of policy paralysis. It was fuelled by the intention to 
keep borders open without formalizing and regulating the presence of Syrian 
refugees as well as through the outsourcing of assistance and protection services 
to local governments, UN, INGOS, and NGOs. 
In the early days of the crisis, Prime Minister Mikati stated that ‘we disassociate 
ourselves politically, but we don't disassociate from the needs of our Syrian 
brothers and our humanity’.85 It was humanitarian considerations that prevented 
the government from fully blocking the entry of Syrians. The statement of an 
expert on migration from Lebanon offers some insights into the reasons that stood 
behind this initial open door policy: 
During the war 2006 the people who fled from Lebanon, they fled to 
Syria, there are a lot of intermarriage population, so there are already 
ties due to being border countries. Even the economy is interlinked 
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 80 The Syria Needs Analysis Project 2013. 
 81 UNHCR and UNDP 2016. 
 82 The Syria Needs Analysis Project 2013. 
 83 See UNHCR and UNDP 2016. 
 84 Nashed 2016. 
 85 The Daily Star 2012a. 
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somehow … So out of humanitarian considerations and out of their 
past, they open the borders.86 
But the policy cannot only be explained by kinship, long-term trade relations and 
the lack of demarcated borders. A political stalemate and the lack of state 
regulatory capacity also played a role. As in the words of an interviewee: ‘The 
political factions are completely opposing each other as a result no major policy 
decisions were being made in Lebanon at this time’.87 Nevertheless, different 
components of the government, such as the Shiite Hezbollah Party88, were 
supporting an open-door policy towards mainly Sunni Syrian refugees as well as an 
involvement of humanitarian agencies for aid distribution. Also, because main 
donors such as the Gulf States are Sunni, Hezbollah did not block their 
humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees.89 Lebanese security officers issued 
deportation orders for Syrian refugees in some cases, but they did not actually 
execute them.90 They rarely arrested, prosecuted, or detained them.91 The reason 
for this is that the state probably did not have enough capacities to judge or punish 
every crime relating to border entries or visas. 
On the other hand, there were notable ambiguities. Lebanon avoided using the 
term of refugee for Syrians and avoided establishing camps. Terminology 
preference, in turn, allowed Lebanon to avoid commitments for refugee 
protection. In particular, in terms of providing protection and shelter, and in 
ensuring access to education, health services and the labour market—which are to 
be ensured by all signatories of the Refugee Convention. The categorical rejection 
of granting refugee status and establishing refugee camps has been tied to past 
experiences with Palestinian refugees who have lived in Lebanon for more than 60 
years. Reinforced by certain Lebanese politicians and the media, many Lebanese 
have vehemently opposed the establishment of camps, commonly referred to as 
‘no-law zones’ and ‘spaces of refugee for criminals’.92 They have been afraid that 
camps might turn into perpetual dwellings for jihadist salafist groups, as points of 
attraction for Syrian and Israel aggressions, as constituting a destabilising danger 
for Lebanon93 and that these would encourage the permanent settlement of Syrian 
refugees similar to what had happened with the Palestinian refugees. Particularly 
Hezbollah announced its opposition to the establishment of such camps within its 
geographic areas of influence. Its deputy leader, Sheikh Naim Qassem, stated: ‘We 
                                                          
 86 Interview with a Lebanese Co-director of an international NGO, Beirut, 14 April 2016. 
 87 Interview with a representative of INGOs serving in Lebanon, Beirut, 13 April 2016. 
 88 It remains unclear what the stance of other political parties has been towards the refugee 
crisis, and what their preferred response would be. They seem to share concerns about 
security and the risk of destabilising the demographic balance. There is a consensus about 
rejecting any permanent settlement option for both Palestinian and Syrian refugees. 
 89 Drawing from this case, Hugh Eakin (2013) writes that 'it is one of the more paradoxical 
consequences of the Syrian conflict: while the war has deeply divided the Middle East, the 
refugee crisis it has produced is forcing the opposing sides to work together outside Syria’s 
borders.'  
 90 Interview with an UNHCR Protect Officer in Beirut Office, Beirut, 13 April 2016. 
 91 The Syria Needs Analysis Project 2013. 
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cannot accept refugee camps for Syrians in Lebanon because any camp will become 
a military pocket that will be used as a launch pad against Syria and then against 
Lebanon’.94 On the other hand, challenging security-based explanations, Lewis 
Turner (2015) argues that Lebanon preferred non-encampment of Syrians because 
‘its economy “requires” large numbers of low-wage Syrian workers’.95 
7 Regulation Attempts from late 2014 to 2016 
Lebanon’s almost three-year-long generosity towards Syrians, which has been 
widely commented upon by the international community, gradually came to an end 
in the last months of 2014. In its initial formulation, the policy changes did not 
contain any repressive measures, such as deportation or border closing, but rather 
sought to control Syrians’ entrance, exit and stay.96 According to policy makers, 
decline in the numbers would on the one hand be achieved through the 
‘encouragement’ of refugees who had been registered within UNHCR to leave for 
other countries, and on the other hand by making new entries difficult. This phase 
can be called a ‘regulation policies’ phase. 
Lebanese tendency towards a more restrictive stance started with Palestinian 
refugees from Syria, of which some were denied entry and others were deported 
without trial in Spring 2014.97 After closing a few unofficial border-crossing points, 
in June 2014 the Lebanese authorities announced that only Syrians coming from 
Lebanese border areas engulfed in fighting would be allowed to enter the 
country.98 On 23 October 2014, the cabinet agreed upon new rules for Syrian 
refugees under the heading ‘reducing numbers’, and imposed laws concerning 
‘(displaced) foreigners’. The new policy consisted of three main goals. The first was 
to halt the Syrian refugee inflow at the borders, with the exception of 
‘humanitarian cases’ assessed by the government. The second was to encourage 
Syrian nationals in Lebanon to return to their country of origin. The third goal was 
to formalise, control and monitor their presence as well as to limit informal 
employment structures.99 
These objectives led to the introduction of concrete restrictive measures to 
govern entrance, registration, and the granting of residential and work permits. To 
regulate entries to the country, the General Directorate of General Security issued 
guidelines on 31 December 2014100 that prescribed different lengths of stay and 
required different supporting documentation depending on the purpose of stay.101 
Syrians need to now provide the necessary documents in one of seven 
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 98 For further information see Amnesty International 2014b; Amnesty International 2015.  
 99 See Lebanon Support 2016: 8–9. 
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categories.102 The majority of these categories allow for entry into Lebanon for a 
defined period of time, ranging from 24 hours to one month.103 Often refugees 
fleeing from Syria fall under the category four, namely ‘entries for those who have 
been displaced’. But the same instructions stipulate that ‘no Syrian shall be 
permitted to enter as a refugee, in exceptional circumstances shall be latter 
determined in coordination with the Ministry of Social Affairs’104. Exceptional 
circumstances are limited to ‘unaccompanied and/or separated children with a 
parent already registered in Lebanon, persons living with disabilities with a relative 
already registered in Lebanon, persons with urgent medical needs for whom 
treatment in Syria is unavailable, and persons who will be resettled in third 
countries’.105 All Syrians who wish to enter Lebanon are required to provide a 
house pledge confirming their place of residence, a certified attestation that the 
landlord owns the property, and two photographs stamped by the mukhtar (the 
administrative head of the village or neighbourhood). 
To regulate registrations and stay, residency permits are put under control of the 
Ministry of Interior and their renewal necessitates strict bureaucratic procedures. 
Syrians who want to obtain a residency permit need to show a legally valid lease 
contract for a rental property and a ‘pledge of responsibility’ signed by a Lebanese 
sponsor (can be a Lebanese national or a Lebanese employer), who thereby 
commits to obtain a work permit for the Syrian individual or group of Syrians, or to 
sponsor and host the family.106 The employer sponsor is supposed to work in 
specific sectors defined in the 2013 Ministry of Labour regulation, such as 
agriculture, construction, environment and cleaning.107 All Syrians above the age of 
15 (both registered by UNHCR and those who are not) are required to pay $200 
each year to renew their permits for six months, and need to provide a range of 
documents. Syrians holding UNHCR certificates are asked to provide a notarized 
commitment that they will not seek employment.108 Also, any Syrian who has to go 
back to Syria, for example to collect a child left behind, or to check on home and 
property, automatically loses his/her refugee status.109 
In addition to these measures, the Lebanese government agreed to formulate a 
crisis response plan in December 2014 that addresses both humanitarian assistance 
and stabilization efforts. Being the first plan of its kind110, the Lebanon Crisis 
                                                          
102 Category one is for tourism, shopping, business, landlords, and tenants; category two is for 
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Response Plan 2015–16 (LCRP) came into existence through a joint endeavour of 
the Lebanese government, UN agencies, various international organizations as well 
as international and local non-governmental organization.111 This LCRP is based on 
an agreed set of priorities guided by national plans and strategies, implemented 
under the overall leadership of the Government of Lebanon.112 The LCRP will be 
steered by the Minister of Social Affairs, as designated by the Prime Minister and 
the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, under the oversight of the 
Government Crisis Cell, in collaboration with a line of ministries as well as national 
and international partners.113 The plan proposes three main strategic objectives: 
1)  To ensure humanitarian assistance and protection for the most vulnerable 
amongst those displaced from Syria and poor Lebanese citizens, 
2)  To strengthen the capacity of national and local service delivery systems to 
expand access to and quality of basic public services,  
3)  To reinforce Lebanon’s economic, social, environmental and institutional 
stability, ensuring a continuation of the ‘necessary work of delivering on 
humanitarian assistance to refugees from Syria and other vulnerable groups’, 
while expanding plans to invest in Lebanese services, economies and 
institutions.114 
The plan targets up to 2.8 million of the most vulnerable Lebanese, displaced 
Syrians and Palestinian refugees; 1.9 million individuals are targeted for protection 
and direct assistance; and 2.1 million individuals are targeted for service delivery, 
economic recovery, and community services.115  Thus, it extends to the target 
population of IOs and NGOs by including vulnerable Lebanese citizens. 
8 Enforcement and Consequences of Regulatory Restrictive 
Policies 
The Lebanese government’s aforementioned restrictive regulation of refugees’ 
entrance, registration, the limited granting of residential and work permits as well 
as the preparation of LCRP were illustrative of an unprecedented policy 
development, given previous scattered policies and weak governance performance. 
They are explicit early indications of overcoming policy paralysis. In order to claim 
that Lebanon fully bypassed policy paralysis in its Syrian refugee response, it is 
important to trace how these measures have been implemented in practice and 
what were the consequences. As a UNHCR Senior Protection Officer from Beirut 
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said: ‘after the policy came out, we were all wondering how and what extend it 
would be implemented. They did implement much of it. Maybe there is even more 
to be implemented, we will see’.116 
First of all, new regulations influenced the border entry regime. New visa 
regulations that require obtaining one of the six types of visas and related 
documents have restricted entry for people desperate to flee from Syria to 
Lebanon.117 As the Ministry of Social Affairs stated, border authorities only allowed 
‘extreme humanitarian cases’ to enter. In the words of a UNHCR Senior Protection 
Officer: 
There is technically one visa category for people seeking 
international protection on the paper but it is not practically applied. 
Currently for any Syrian who wants to come in under displaced status, 
they literally need the signature of the minister himself of social 
affairs and the director general of immigration to allow one person 
in.118  
Some Syrians that came in under the categories of tourism, business, as well as 
some of those who had Lebanese sponsors, were not accepted in Lebanon by army 
officers who considered these Syrians to be potential asylum seekers.119 The 
restrictions caused a 50 percent decline in people seeking to register with the 
UNHCR in November and December 2014 and a drop in monthly registrations of 80 
percent in the first three months of 2015, compared to a similar period in 2014.120 
The decline also continued in 2016.121 
To deter entries, Lebanese authorities have denied anyone who has entered 
through an irregular border the ability to regulate his/her status inside Lebanon. To 
do so, they would need to pay a fee of US $633, leave within five days, and could 
then only re-enter if they met the new entry requirements. If they were not able to 
pay the fine, they were permanently banned from re-entering Lebanon.122 In this 
sense, access to Lebanon for new Syrian refugees has become close to impossible, 
effectively undoing their right to seek asylum via one of their neighbouring 
countries. 
In the realm of registration restrictions, the Lebanese government made a 
substantial change by blocking the UNHCR’s long-term registration function. In 
April 2015, the Ministry of Social Affairs requested that UNHCR de-register over 
1,400 Syrian refugees who had arrived in Lebanon after 5 January 2015.123 In the 
course of a month, Lebanese authorities instructed UNHCR to temporarily suspend 
registration of Syrian refugees, except for humanitarian cases approved by the 
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Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities.124 So, 
UNHCR has not been allowed to register new persons as refugees. 
The most consequential implementation has been observed in the renewal of 
residency permits and in the application for work permits which have logistically 
become much more difficult. According to UNHCR, a year-and-a-half after the new 
regulations came into force, one-in-two registered refugees was not able to renew 
their residency permit and then started to live outside the law.125 In many cases, 
officers of related state institutions have found applicants’ documents inadequate 
and/or inappropriate for the renewal for their residency permits. For instance, half 
of the Syrians interviewed by Human Rights Watch acknowledged that although 
they have been registered with the UNHCR, the General Security has denied them 
the ability to renew their residency permits and told them to find a work 
sponsor.126 The sponsors, in these cases, would have to sign a ‘pledge of 
responsibility’ that holds them accountable for the individual’s respective legal and 
criminal acts.127 
Moreover, the Ministry of Labour put restrictions over the access of Syrian 
workers to the Lebanese labour market and started to monitor informal 
employment.128 Government representatives have emphasised their commitment 
not to allow Syrians to work. Foreign Minister, Gebran Bassil, also the leader of the 
Free Patriotic Movement, has made calls to companies to respect this law. 
New restrictions did not fully regularize Syrians’ presence in the country, but 
encouraged many Syrians to return.129 Such an intensive bureaucratization has 
caused many to lose their residency permits. Lebanese authorities have not 
published statistics about the rate of illegality, but it is known that many Syrians 
are already without legal papers or find themselves in immediate danger of losing 
them in the near future.130 Lacking legal documents and/or facing the risk of losing 
their refugee status, has put Syrians and Palestinians from Syria into the category 
of illegal immigrants who are subject to various types of further vulnerabilities, 
including expulsion. It has further caused serious difficulties in schooling and 
healthcare, while registration of new births, marriages and divorces has become 
almost impossible. 
Restrictions on work permits have pushed more Syrians to work without having 
official contracts, and opened up more spaces for clientelistic structures and 
overlapping practices of bribery, blackmailing, exploitation and corruption.131 Due 
to a lack of rights in work places, Syrians face longer hours without proper 
payment, insurance or adequate job security. Also, these arrangements have put 
employers and brokers in a position of power. Brokers charge huge amounts of 
money, sometimes deceive those who are left at their mercy, and landowners 
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increase rents. Reports note incoherence, informality, and insecurity in the renewal 
process, which causes Syrians to sidestep authorities, deepening the gap between 
them and the government. A vivid black market of fake sponsors, brokers, 
employers, and contracts emerged and evolved.132 Officers of the state (General 
Security, municipalities etc.) do not refrain from daily insults, mistreatment as well 
as occasional incidents of physical abuse in order to scare refugees, to discourage 
them from staying and working in Lebanon. 
A news review verified the existence of frequent curfews, arrests and detention 
cases. From August 2014 to August 2015, at least 45 municipalities across the 
country imposed curfews for Syrians for couple of days (sometimes longer), 
without providing any real reasons and despite not having the legal authority to in 
fact impose curfews, either on Lebanese citizens or foreigners. 133 Curfews have 
also been followed by forced evictions, arrests and detentions, primarily on 
security grounds. More than 7,000 people were forcibly evicted in the first quarter 
of 2015.134 Mass arrests lead to arbitrary detentions of dozens of Syrians for days 
or longer, primarily on the basis that these did not have the required legal 
documents.135 For example, on 15 October 2016, army intelligence conducted raids 
in tented settlements where Syrians live in dozens, arrested 40 people without 
proper documentation and turned them over the judiciary.136 
Meanwhile, refugees have almost no resources to seek justice. They avoid turning 
to authorities for protection due to fear of being arrested and repercussions if they 
appealed.137 The only official protection for Syrian refugees against arrest and 
subsequent deportation is ‘Lebanon’s recognition of refugees’ entry papers 
stamped by the UNHCR and the Lebanese General Security.’138 Lack of legality 
limits their freedom of movement and prospects for the future. They remain with 
few options and either stay in Lebanon without legal papers, or leave for another 
destination to seek alternative economic opportunities in Europe. Furthermore, 
previous experiences show that such grievances and lack of future prospects may 
provide fertile ground for the recruitment of young refugees by militant groups. 
In addition to all these consequential restrictive policies, the repatriation of 
Syrians is also on the agenda of Lebanese politicians. One of the earliest proposals 
was voiced in 2013 by the Lebanese ambassador to the US. He said: ‘We cannot 
bear this burden; they should go back to and resettle in Syria which is 18 times 
bigger than Lebanon.’139 Officially, the issue started to be discussed when Labour 
Minister Sejaan Azzi announced his study on a new plan in September 2016 with 
the following words: 
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To avoid an obscure experience, we must make clear decisions. We do 
not want emotions, but rather a project to repatriate the Syrian 
refugees, so that both peoples could preserve their countries … 
Return of refugees to their country was required to redefine the 
essence of the conflict in that country. The implementation of the 
plan, which will be announced in January 2017, will extend along two 
years, calling upon donors to cover the cost.140 
The most concerning signal about repatriation was revealed during the UN 
Migration and Refugee Summit in 2016. During his speech at the Summit, Prime 
Minister Tammam Salam warned the international community not to look to 
Lebanon as a place of permanent asylum for Syrian refugees. Salam reiterated 
Lebanon’s official stance and reaffirmed its absolute rejection of naturalization.141 
Although it is known that repatriation is practically impossible and most 
government officials have respected the principle of non-refoulement and 
acknowledged that they may not forcibly return Syrians, the Lebanese government 
has made similar statements on a number of other occasions. As an interlocutor 
pointed out, what the Lebanese government is hoping for is that there will be a 
political settlement in Syria or at least the creation of safe zones between the 
Lebanese-Syrian border.142 The government has been keeping the repatriation 
issue on the agenda as an effort to gain leverage against the international 
community’s demand for the naturalization of Syrians. In the course of UN General 
Secretary Ban Ki Moon’s visit in March 2016, Lebanon was requested to grant 
citizenship to Syrians. Ban Ki Moon’s statement caused a political reaction143 and a 
public outcry. According to interviewees, his statement was ‘naïve’ and only 
demonstrated ‘his lack of knowledge about Lebanese realities and history’.144 But 
when this turned into the UN’s official agenda and was raised more frequently, 
government officers needed to show a firm stance for the rejection of 
naturalization. Shortly before the departure of Lebanon’s delegation to the Donor 
Conference in London in February 2016, Gebran Bassil, Lebanon’s foreign minister 
said his country must be ‘very cautious not to tolerate the passing of new 
statements’ that would encourage Syrians to remain in Lebanon permanently. 
Although Bassil has proposed a project that would allow a limited number of 
refugees access to short-term contracts in the building and farming sectors, he has 
previously also called for the establishment of safe zones inside Syria as an 
alternative solution to the refugee crisis.145 So, in the end, Lebanon has reached a 
policy point of pushing for repatriation. 
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9 The Reasons behind Policy Changes 
As explored above, Lebanon has recently chosen to formulate a strict policy of 
border management and reception to dissuade Syrian refugees, while it has 
avoided creating protection and integration policies. It is necessary to delve into 
the reasons that stand behind such policy changes. Evidence shows that policy 
changes in border control and reception are reflective of the country’s recognition 
that it is facing a demographic challenge, as well as its desire to appease negative 
public sentiment, and to renegotiate its sovereignty vis-à-vis increasing 
involvement of international organizations in refugee governance. On the other 
hand, it refrains from developing protection and integration policies due to a lack 
of capacity, ideational concerns (regarding the delicate sectarian balance) and its 
historical experience of a protracted Palestinian refugee issue. The details will be 
discussed below. 
First of all, the issue of having been confronted with increasing numbers of 
refugees within the course of a few years and, in turn, the negative public 
sentiment that this has sparked, necessitated the government to do something. As 
a result of the refugee flow, Lebanon has been forced to grapple with a 
demographic shock.146 When Lebanon first introduced entry restrictions in 5 
January 2015, Interior Minister Nohad Machnouk said in a press conference 
broadcasted on local television that ‘we have enough. There’s no capacity any more 
to host more displaced’.147 Similarly, when they asked about refugee policy 
changes, Lebanese informants first pointed out numbers. For example, a migration 
scholar expressed this point with a margin of exaggeration: ‘They are criticizing the 
Lebanese government for not doing enough. We are the only country in the world 
that has half of its population consisting of refugees’.148 Secondly, interviewees 
mentioned the lack of adequate state capacity ‘given the fact that also 
Government doesn’t provide the normal services for the Lebanese people, so how 
could they do for the Syrians and even the labour market cannot absorb the 
Lebanese themselves’.149 
Being aware of such common thoughts, the government has aimed to mediate 
negative public perceptions. Although international humanitarian agencies have 
partially embraced aid and service delivery to refugees since 2012, even by paying 
local families a given amount to host Syrian refugees for a limited period of them 
(max. one year),150 local Lebanese communities’ reluctance about Syrians’ presence 
(an ‘othering’ of them) has nevertheless grown in years. Specifically, local 
communities have been concerned about the decrease in local employment 
opportunities due to the availability of cheaper menial labour provided by Syrians, 
the increase in the cost of living, housing problems, differences in cultural attitudes 
as well as security concerns (including an increase in petty crimes). Syrians are 
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criticized for overstaying their welcome, working illegally, stealing the jobs of 
nationals and enjoying both international and local aid. Lebanon’s Social Affairs 
Minister Rashid Derbas has described opening up the country’s job market to Syrian 
refugees as neither ‘possible’ nor ‘appropriate’ due to on-going unemployment in 
the country and due to presence of Palestinian refugees.151 
As demonstrated in the words of a Lebanese expert working for an INGO, the fact 
that Syrians have been able to work in Lebanon and getting aid creates tensions: 
Refugees are getting money from the UNHCR and hundred dollars 
for the Syrian person who was living in Syria is a lot, for Lebanese it’s 
just … So, if you take from UNHCR that money, you get money 
working here in Lebanon and then you could go into Syria and get all 
the cheap products from there and coming back, when it’s time to 
get the money from UNHCR. This situation, coming and going, and 
having an advantage over the Lebanese people, the poor people, 
because the refugees they came into the places where the most 
vulnerable and the most poor people are living and they took maybe 
their jobs. So, the Government said that we can’t help them in such a 
way and then opening the borders, because the Lebanese people 
started to show their discontent and the Government had the 
attention to do something against it, so that’s when they started to 
say ok, we will do something about it and we will enforce the entry 
permit or the residence permit, which was there since ever, but it was 
never enforced in such a way.152 
The tension among Lebanese host and Syrian refugee communities has a socio-
economic character that can be summarized as a competition over scarce jobs, 
resources and aid.153 In fact, conflict dynamics are not necessarily new or related to 
recent developments, but rather the crisis has ‘acted as a magnifying glass of the 
structural and pre-existing conflictual dynamics in the region’.154  All of these 
created resentments among Lebanese citizens who, in turn, have put pressure on 
political parties. Thus, the government needed to take action, trying to negotiate 
particularly with the UN agencies—as seen in the formulation of LCRP—and aiming 
to also put the vulnerability of host communities on the agenda.155 
Another concern of the government and the public is intimately tied to identity 
issues. Syrian refugees have been considered as a threat to Lebanon’s delicate 
sectarian balances, because most refugees are Sunni Arabs. Many see the arrival of 
more than one million Sunni Arabs—with a possibility of permanent settlement 
similar to Palestinians—as having the potential to destabilize the fundamental 
roots of an already fragile political system and social order. In the words of Labour 
Minister Sejaan Azzi: ‘National identity is threatened with change, as the Lebanese 
entity is at risk. Therefore, the return of the Syrians to Syria is a necessity’. Similarly, 
                                                          
151 Armstrong 2016. 
152 Interview with a Lebanese Co-director of an international NGO, Beirut, 14 April 2016. 
153 Lebanon Support 2015: 27. 
154 Ibid.: 28. 
155 Focus group gtudy with experts on NGO work in Lebanon, Beirut, 12 April 2016. 
Şahin Mencutek  |  From Inaction to Restrictions . . . 
 
 
 
Global Cooperation Research Papers 19 28 
 
 
Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil has warned that the Syrian refugee crisis is 
threatening the ‘Lebanese identity’.156 An expert explained why the issue is seen as 
a threat by government officers when he said: ‘They believe that Lebanon suffers 
from this sectarian system and sharing power and most of the Syrian refugees are 
Sunni and this would totally bring Lebanon to chaos’.157 As observed in the 
Palestinian case, there is a consensus about the rejection of integration for Syrians. 
In the words of a Lebanese expert on humanitarian aid: ‘I guess almost everybody is 
against the integration, if you say integration is like naturalization … it’s not on the 
table at all and not for anybody.’158 Nevertheless, state capacity is the rationale 
behind anti-integration discourse. As a Lebanese scholar pointed out: ‘The 
integration cannot be pragmatic plan, because it entails some responsibility for 
some part of state and state does not want to take this responsibility.’159 
Moreover, concerns about security and safety have fuelled concerns about the 
erosion of state sovereignty, which is seen to be challenged from three directions. 
A first challenge is seen to be posed by cross border incursions; second, by a loss of 
control over public security; and third, by a lack of power and regulation concerning 
the engagement of the UN, INGOs and NGOs in the humanitarian aid and 
development sectors. 
Border incidents have been common and fluctuating since the early days of the 
uprising in Syria—committed by both the Syrian regime and the opposition forces. 
While the former has conducted air strikes and airspace violations, the latter has 
sparked clashes, land violations and border crossings. The army did not have the 
capacity to fully control the Syria-Lebanon border, as was observed in October 
2011 when Syrian regime forces chased rebellion groups across the border and the 
Lebanese army was not able to intervene.160 Thus, the Lebanese state restricted 
border controls, but failed to provide full control. 
The outbreak of the Syrian crisis reinforced the emergence of radical salafist 
militancy in Palestinian refugee camps where militia groups have been 
‘strengthening their ranks, developing clandestine networks with some 
components of the Lebanese and Syrian jihadist sphere’.161 There has been 
evidence for ties emerging between some armed elements of the Syrian refugee 
population and radical Islamist factions in the Palestinian refugee camps, given the 
fact that Syrian refugees increasingly settle in the Palestinian refugee camps as 
shelter grows scarcer.162 For instance, Ain al-Hilwah became the headquarters for 
some Salafist jihadist armed groups that are opposed to the Lebanese army and 
Hezbollah, and who maintain close political and security ties with some factions of 
the Syrian opposition, especially Jabhat an-Nusra, the official al-Qaeda affiliate in 
Syria. It has been suspected that Palestinians and Syrians, as Sunni-dominated 
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refugee populations, find common cause and undertake joint attacks against 
Lebanese adversaries—particularly the Lebanese Army and the Internal Security 
Forces.163 Such an involvement of Palestinian camps in the context of the Syrian 
crisis might have acute political and military implications for Lebanon similar to 
those experienced during the civil war. 
The Lebanese state has advanced gradual and nationwide securitization of Syrian 
refugees’ presence with the tacit support of media and political networks in order 
to comfort its own citizens as well as to demonstrate its sovereignty over territory 
and population. New policies suggest that marking the territory as Lebanese is 
done in order to manage and control ‘the home’ which is ‘outnumbered and 
overpopulated’ by Syrians.164 Lebanese felt that they have a responsibility to 
safeguard their home’ and not to allow Syrian refugees to occupy their space.165 
Concerns over sovereignty also encompass regulating and monitoring both 
citizens and foreigners who live in the country. In order to regain control, the state 
has imposed strict residency permit regulations, while UNHCR’s registration was 
suspended. Moreover, municipalities have exercised state power by imposing more 
raids and curfews on Syrians, even though their success was previously 
questioned.166 The words of Lebanon’s interior ministry adviser Khalil Gebara, in a 
response to the question about municipality raids in refugee settlements, 
emphasised the notion of sovereignty:  
It [ministry] is trying to regain in some of the excesses of the 
municipalities, but insists it must balance that against the reality of 
massively overburdened infrastructure, as well as security concerns. 
Hundreds of Syrians do not have any papers, which means we do not 
even know who they are. We must remember there are bombings 
that have taken place in Lebanon and there is a war that's 50 km 
away from the Lebanese border.167   
Although there are no real security threats or in fact a traceable rise in crime, the 
state and non-state security apparatus has emphasized its need to guarantee for 
security, and has in this regard also pointed particularly to Syrian refugees. State 
gendarmerie forces have been involved in controlling and monitoring the refugee 
community. They have authority to intervene in scenes of conflict and violence, but 
they are predominantly seen as corrupt, violent, as employing illegal methods. At 
the same time, they are seen as being ‘protected and rendered immune by the 
state.’168 Many municipalities increased their security presence with more staff.169 
Moreover, the country has observed the ‘emergence of privatized security 
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networks organized around traditional notables or political parties’.170  These 
actors together continue to further securitize refugee presence. 
Another concern of the Lebanese state around sovereignty is concerned with the 
intense international intervention in refugee governance. In fact, Lebanon has been 
a country with a high density of national and international NGOs since 1990.171 
There has been limited state regulation over them, because the country has been 
suffering from wars and related structural shortcomings in governance across 
many sectors. UN agencies and INGOs took the initial lead in responding to Syrian 
displacement by first delivering massive amounts of material and non-material aid. 
Also, international donors funded several projects of local NGOs. But, decreasing 
levels of aid and failures in meeting commitments disappointed Lebanon in terms 
of burden sharing by the international community. In this line, Amnesty 
International argues that ‘the lack of international support in the form of a 
meaningful number of resettlement places and financial assistance has almost 
certainly played a role in Lebanon’s decision to impose such significant restrictions 
on refugees from Syria’.172 As in the words of Labour Minister Sejaan Azzi: ‘No aid 
being offered to Lebanon can compensate for the burden of hosting Syrian 
refugees, calling on the international community to find a real solution to the 
crisis.’173 The disappointment of and reaction to the international community and 
its representatives (UN agencies and INGOs) was reflected in the government’s 
order to UNHCR to stop registration in 2015. Different narratives of informants 
give insights into the tensions between UNHCR and the Lebanese state. As one 
informant said: ‘They imposed to stop the registration because they close the 
border. So what they are practically saying is that there are no new refugees 
coming.’174 Conversely, another informant noted that ‘it is not just the government 
but it is also UNHCR itself, the whole UN, saying that there are no longer funds’.175 
The lack of state control and regulation has also raised concerns about the 
capacity of the Lebanese government to respond external concerns of demands. 
During focus group, the issue was addressed by a Lebanese migration expert: 
Since the beginning we were trying to voice that we want more state 
in the management of this respond.  International funding was 
written on the assumption during the first year that there is no state 
in Lebanon. All in the sudden, the state is back in.176 
To tackle this problem, in addition to strict regulations, the Lebanese 
government collaborated with the UN and INGOs to prepare the Lebanon Crisis 
Response Plan (LCRP). The LCRP illustrates how the Lebanese government aims to 
exert greater control over refugee governance that was externalized to 
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international actors over the last few years. The government has sought to address 
its concerns and reshape its relationship with the plethora of international 
organizations that used to be bypassing the government in the process of 
managing issues in Lebanon.177 A conversation that I observed between a German 
representative of an NGO funded by Germany and a Lebanese humanitarian aid 
expert reveals what lies at the heart of these tensions. When the German 
representative legitimized bypassing the government due to its weak performance 
and corruption, the Lebanese expert reacted with the following sentences: 
Excuse me, this is my country, so I have to manage my country by 
myself and if you come into my country as a foreigner and you would 
like to arrange things which are proper to my job, then it’s not ok, you 
have at least to coordinate with me and I have to solve this 
problem.178 
The German representative went on by explaining the situation of paralysis: 
Because of course the Lebanon Government was asking for the 
international support, they got a lot of money, but you don’t have to 
complain, but then this government was incapable of making any 
decisions and also legally they cannot receive funds, because they 
need approval of the Council of Ministries or the Parliament or 
whatever. They are all not working.179 
An officer of an international NGO who worked in Lebanon for three years 
reported that: 
The relationship between government and NGOs is very tense right 
now. Because the government wants money, but donors do not feel 
comfortable with that because they know the government is very 
problematic in taking any action. For example, the Ministry of Water 
is saying all water projects have to be approved by the government, 
that is gonna take forever.180 
A Senior Protection Officer from UNHCR shared the concerns voiced by INGO 
representatives, but he also added that the UN has been looking to advocate some 
issues with the government such as the registration of refugees.181 At the same 
time, it is also recognised that the government is trying to increase its negotiation 
power in international platforms. As one interviewee pointed out: 
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My opinion is that the government is creating all of those barriers 
about legal status, it is paper, that is how it is. But they are creating 
all of these to make it difficult for Syrians and also to create some 
leverage for themselves. So the Lebanese government can go to the 
donors at the London Conference and this is exactly what happened 
and say you know give us 10 billion dollars just give it to the 
government and we will let the Syrians exist. And now there is a 
negotiation around the program called STEP where the government 
will give 300,000 work permits to Syrians. The reality is Syrians are 
working.182 
As interviewees noted, despite newly introduced strict policies and negative 
comments of politicians concerning Syrians’ access to the job market, the Lebanese 
government has made commitments in international platforms to attract funding, 
such as was being proposed with a Statement of Intent during the February 2016 
Syrian Crisis Conference in London. The government promised to create around 
300,000 to 350,000 jobs, of which 60 percent could be for Syrians via investments in 
municipalities and job creation in labour intensive sectors. The new job 
opportunities will not only facilitate Syrians access to labour market but also 
support to meet the Lebanese infrastructure needs.183 It is seen that the Lebanese 
state has gradually increased its leverage power by rendering transparent the 
burden that lies on its shoulders.  
Also, the case of Lebanon demonstrates the role of contingency and imitation in 
responding to mass refugee movements. Contingency and imitation occur at both 
discursive and policy levels.  
At a discursive level, it has been evident that politicians, policymakers, IO, NGOs 
and research funding bodies across Europe have largely framed the arrival of 
refugees and migrants in 2015 as an unprecedented ‘event’, ‘refugee crisis’ and as 
evidence of an ‘on-going crisis’ of migration. Also, the political establishment and 
the media spectacles in Lebanon have adopted the same framing and added terms 
of ‘emergency crisis’. In comparison to European countries, Lebanon had greater 
and more complex strategic geo-political and military stakes in Syria’s on-going 
armed conflict and in the forced mobility of Syrians. In fact, the very language of 
‘migrant crisis’ or ‘refugee crisis’ has direct policy implications. It works to 
dehumanize the migrant subjects of crisis, and places them in a nebulous place of 
irregularity and illegality. It ‘tends to relocate “crisis” in the body and person of the 
figurative migrant/refugee, as if s/he is the carrier of a disease called “crisis”, and 
thus carries the contagion of “crisis” wherever s/he may go’.184 The figure of the 
migrant/refugee hereby has been framed as one that threatens many significant 
phenomena across different locations, such as European values and integration or 
Lebanon’s national identity, sovereignty and stability. A very extreme case 
exemplifying how refugees are seen as carriers of the contagion of ‘crisis’ can be 
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found in the Ǧizzīn municipality in South Lebanon where public gatherings were 
entirely prohibited to Syrian nationals in 2014.185 
Most importantly, the framing of the refugee movement as a crisis helps to 
legitimate the authorization of exceptional or emergency—mainly security 
driven—governmental measures, policies and then their normalization.186 In 
Lebanon, the crisis discourse leads to the exercise of excessive power to govern, 
control and contain refugees; to extreme forms of migration policing; and to a 
limitation of IO’s capacities to assist refugees. The discourse normalizes 
controversial policies such as high fees for the renewal of residency permits 
despite regularization attempts; difficulties in granting work permits despite a high 
rate among Syrian refugees working; and the system of sponsorship which itself 
creates vulnerabilities and further illegalities. Moreover, the very term of crisis 
legitimizes measures such as curfews, raids to refugee settlements, detention and 
seizures of refugees’ belongings that violate the very fundamental rights of 
refugees.   
The crisis centric-securitizing discourses of the EU have been closely appropriated 
by Lebanon, criticising European countries for advocating measures that aim to 
prevent further immigration to Europe, and the international community at large 
for global inaction. When the international community brought the issues of 
naturalisation and working rights for Syrians on the agenda, Lebanon reacted to 
them fiercely on the basis that these would risk the permanent settlement of 
refugees. Paradoxically, the framing based on emergency crises worked to benefit 
Lebanon in terms of getting more financial support—due to the fact that ‘crises’ 
are still more able to attract international attention.    
On this point, it is worthwhile mentioning that scholarship and research on these 
topics has commonly come to recapitulate both the dominant discourses of ‘crisis’ 
and to re-reify them. As De Genova et al. (2016) put it rightly; there is a need to 
problematize the discursive construction of crisis and to critically ask the question 
of whose ‘crisis’? In general, this is fundamentally a ‘crisis’ of state power over 
transnational human mobility.187 Particularly for countries like Lebanon, this 
refugee movement is a reality moment that shows the crisis of neglected refugee 
governance and magnifies the country's long-term policy paralysis. 
10 Conclusion 
There is increasing attention being paid to how Syrians’ massive displacement has 
impacted refugee governance in EU countries, but there is less attention being 
turned towards understanding refugee politics and policy making in the first 
destination counties. Here, questions concerning the role of actors, the interaction 
of actors, as well as the factors playing into refugee policymaking and their 
directions are crucial. Studies exploring patterns in the first destination countries 
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will contribute towards theory development in the forced migration and refugee 
studies literature. On the practical level, it is important to explore their policies in 
more detail—particularly, as it is already well documented that these have had a 
significant impact on the continuation of refugee movements towards Europe. 
In the first five years of the Syrian crisis, neighbouring destination countries—
Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon—reached their limits demographically and the 
integration of all refugees seemed to be hindered by a lack of capacity, political will 
and public support. Instead, the Syrian refugee issue has required them to either 
reframe their border control, reception, protection and integration policies, which 
used to be neither absent nor ad hoc until the previous years. As seen in the case of 
Lebanon, these countries have attempted to create restrictive policies, following 
an open-door policy and generosity towards refugees in initial years. The countries 
are gradually receding from a humanitarian approach on the one hand, and they are 
creating ambiguous policies on the other. While border management and reception 
policies are highly regularized, protection and integration policies are almost non-
existent. They seek to externalize refugee governance to the international 
community by employing a burden-sharing discourse and simultaneously intend to 
shape it according to their priorities and concerns. 
Insights from the Lebanese case allow us to hypothesize that previous refugee 
experience, governance capacity, domestic politics and the country’ stake in the 
conflict come to define policy making on refugees in destination countries. 
Research on Turkey and Jordan proves that domestic politics as well as the stake in 
the crisis, overwhelmingly determine the direction of refugee policy in both 
countries. In addition, previous experience and governance capacity appear as 
additionally detrimental factors in the Jordanian case.188 In sum, the weight of each 
factor may differ according to the specificity of each country. 
To conclude, Syrian mass forced migration has not only been challenging the 
existing norms and regulations that define refugee governance in Europe, but has 
also threated already fragile and scattered systems in the main hosting countries of 
the Global South, paralyzing the refugee regime in the long run. On the other hand, 
such policies urge more refugees to seek shelter outside of the affected regions, 
even by trying more dangerous routes and methods. In order to build better global 
cooperation in the refugee protection realm, there is a need to consider the 
impacts of current mass forced migration by starting to examine discourses, 
conditions and policy changes in the main host countries, paying specific attention 
to discourses and interactions. 
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